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The Premiums of SCOREs and PRIMEs: A Further
Investigation of Transaction Cost Saving Hypothesis
Jartow and 0'Hara(1989) found significant premiums in the prices of primes and
scores, and attributed this price disparity to regulatory constraints in short sales and trust
size limitations, thereby making transaction costs so large that the score will be
preferable to dynamic hedging. The purpose of this paper is to further examine the
premiums associated with primes and scores using more comprehensive data and more
direct methodology. We show that the transaction cost saving hypothesis of Jarrow and
O'Hara is not well supported, using a larger period with more observations. This leaves
the question of why the premiums exist. We attempt to offer some alternative
explanations.

The Premiums of SCOREs and PRIMEs: A Further
Investigation of Transaction Cost Saving Hypothesis
I. Introduction
Unbundling securities has gained significant attention of investors in recent years.
In the absence of arbitrage opportunities, the total market value of any set of identical
income streams received by investors should remain the same regardless of
recapitalization, which is referred to, in general, as the value additivity principle (VAP).
The research on the unbundling of stocks through PRIMEs and SCOREs is
limited because of its relatively short history. A recent study, Jarrow and O'Hara (1989),
using five stocks' primes and scores around their initial offering, documents that the sum
of prime and score prices considerably exceeds the price of underlying stock and thus the
VAP does not hold. They examined three alternative hypotheses for the premiums: the
market completeness hypothesis, the transaction cost hypothesis and the tax-based
hypothesis. Their conclusion is that the large transaction costs of dynamic hedging
contribute to the premiums and are a plausible reason for the overpricing of the prime
and the score. Acknowledging the score as a long-term European call option, they argue
that the long-term option created by the score avoids the cost of replicating such an
option via dynamic hedging in the short-term options market, causing the score to be
more valuable than predicted by a standard option pricing model. The costs of dynamic
hedging occur when investors roll over short-term options to replicate a long-term option.
2Therefore, the ability to save on transaction costs may make the sum of the prime and
score prices greater than the price of the underlying stock.
1 However, the data used in
Jarrow and O'Hara is very limited, including only five stocks, American Home Products,
Bristol-Myers, DuPont, Exxon and Merck. Except for Exxon, four of the trusts were
started at the beginning of 1987. Jarrow and O'Hara terminate their data in June 1987.
This limits the number of months of their sample to between two and five months for
these stocks. Exxon started in December of 1985, thus gives eighteen months of data for
this firm. The small data set of five companies over a very short period 1, 2, 3, 4, and
18 months casts serious doubts on the confidence one has in their results. In Jarrow and
O'Hara's own words, "our results, although encouraging, are inconclusive. Based on weak
evidence....Additional research is needed along these lines." This paper provides such
research using twenty four months of data for all twenty six of the firms that have primes
and scores.2
This paper further investigates the VAP using more data of the scores and primes
for a longer time period than the previous study and shows that the premiums of scores
and primes do indeed exist but they may not be due to the transaction costs involved in
dynamic hedging. This result leaves the question of why the premiums exist unanswered.
We attempt to offer some alternative explanations.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II briefly reviews the
structure of primes and scores. Section III presents the results of the VAP tests. In
Section IV, we reexamine the transaction cost saving hypothesis and provide evidence
that the hypothesis is not well supported. Section V contains alternative hypotheses and
concluding remarks.
n
-
Review of Primes anH Scores
In 1983, Americas Shareowners Service Corp. created the first Americus Trust,
.he purpose of which was to divide an existing share of AT&T cotntnon stock into two
distinct tradeable instruments: prime and score? The second trust was offered on
Exxon common stock m 1985. The remaining trusts such as trusts on American Express
American Home Product, ATT-Series 2, Amoco, ARCO, Bristol Myers, Chevron,
Coca-Cola, Dow, DuPont, Kodak, Ford, GE, CM, CTE, Hewlett Packard, IBM, Johnson
* Johnson, Merck, Mobtl, Phtlip Morris, Procter ft Gamble, Sears, Union Pacific, and
Xerox were offered during 1987 (see Table 1 for details). The conversion of one share
into a score and a prime, allows investors to separate the potential capital appreciation in
excess of a stipulated dollar amount from the right to receive dividends and a„ other
attributes of share ownership. The ow.er of the prime (pnmeholder) receives dividends
and any appreciation in price up to a predetermined termma,ion value whereas the
owner of the score (scoreholder) receives the capita, appreciation on the underlying
stock, if any, over the predetermined termination value. The primeholder retains the
voting right.
At the beginning of each trust, a shareholder can elect to tender each share to
more than five percent of a corporation's outstanding common stock. When this level is
reached, the trust is closed and no additional shares may be tendered to the trust. The
m of the trust is fixed at five year, At maturity, the outstanding umts are converted into
4the corresponding stock. Prior to the termination of the trust, any unseparated unit and
any prime and score component may be redeemed for the net asset value per unit.
When the stock is tendered to the trust, there is an initial commission which decreases on
a per share basis as the number of shares tendered increases. The primeholder is also
charged an annual management fee of six cents per unit (five cents per unit for Exxon
trust). There is no fee for converting a unit back into the underlying stock. The primes
and scores are traded on the American Stock Exchange.
The primes and scores are comparable to income and capital shares, respectively,
of dual purpose funds even though they are not completely analogous. The dual purpose
funds are closed-end investment companies which are capitalized with two types of
claims: income shares and capital shares. However, there are some differences. A
prime and a score generally sell at a premium to the underlying common stock while the
dual-purpose fund generally sells at a discount to its net asset value. A prime and a
score can be exchanged into the original stock at any time. Also, the underlying asset of
prime and score is common stock while the underlying asset of a dual purpose fund is a
portfolio of securities. Ingersoll (1976) shows that the asset value of the dual purpose
fund exceeds the market value and that it is not inconsistent with market equilibrium or
efficiency for the capital shares to sell at a discount. Litzenberger and Sosin (1977b)
show that institutional restrictions on short selling permit discounts on dual purpose funds
to fluctuate within wide bounds, and these fluctuations are consistent with market
efficiency.
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III. Tests of the Value Additivitv Principle
A. The Data and Methodology
The data set includes the daily closing prices of primes, scores, and stocks for all
the twenty-six companies from July 1987 to June 1989, collected from the Wall Street
Journal as Jarrow and O'Hara.5 Stock prices were adjusted for stock splits during the
sample period.
Let us define the deviation of the sum of prime and score prices from the stock
price as:
D, = P
p,
+ P
sl
- P, (1)
where P
t
: the price of prime at time t,
P
sl
: the price of score at time t,
P
t
: the price of stock at time t,
D
t
: the deviation of prime and score prices from the stock price at time t.
When the premiums are tested using the actual data, noise in the prices of scores,
primes and stocks should be considered, because we are dealing with the equilibrium
relationship between the score and prime prices and the stock price.6 Thus, the VAP is
tested by observing the central tendency of the deviations of combined prime and score
prices from the stock prices. By testing the randomness and convergence to zero of the
time-series deviations, it can be determined whether or not the VAP holds systematically.
To test for the randomness and convergence to a nonpositive value of daily
deviations of the combined values of primes and scores from the stock prices, the AR(1)
model, which was used by Litzenberger and Sosin (1977b) and Burns (1987), is applied to
the time series data of Dp as
D
c
= \i + p£>
c_i
+ ec t = 2 , 3 , . . . , T (2
)
where e
t
- N(0,crp
/^constant,
p:the first order correlation coefficient between D
t
and D^.
From equation (2), the first order autocorrelation coefficient, which measures the
rate at which the price differentials are narrowed, is examined for the randomness of Dr
The VAP suggests that | p | < 1 and p. is equal to zero. Therefore, the null hypothesis
is
H : | p | < 1 and \l = 0.
The interpretation of \l and p can be confusing if the assumed AR(1) process
does not fit the data. To avoid this problem of model misspecification, ARMA(1,1) also
is applied to D
t
as,
D
c
= \l + pD^ + e
c
- 66^ t = 2 , 3 , . . . , T ( 3 )
where 6: the first order correlation coefficient between e
t
and e,.,.
In addition, the runs test and sign test are used to reexamine the randomness of
D
t
and whether the expected value of D
t
equals zero, respectively, for nonparametric
tests. The statistic of the runs test is
z =
R " n/2 " 1
J(n 2 -2n)/4(n-l)
where: Z: standard normal distribution statistic,
R: number of runs,
n: number of observations.
The sign test calculates the sample median, the number of values above and below
the hypothesized median and the normal distribution statistic, Z.
B. Empirical Findings
Table 2 presents the summary statistics of the average behavior of Dp premiums
or discounts and includes the maximum and minimum deviations of the combined values
of primes and scores from the stock prices. The mean premium on primes and scores is
$0,995, and the range of the mean premium is from $0.21 to $1.97. This compares to a
mean of $1.20 and a range of $0.73 to $1.85 found by Jarrow and O'Hara.
In the AR(1) model, the VAP is assumed to hold if n = and | p | < 1. Table
3 shows that the average of /i is 0.75, which is significantly greater than zero. The
minimum value of (i is 0.21 for Exxon, which is greater than zero at the significance level
of five percent. The rates of convergence vary from a low of 0.15 for Procter and
Gamble to a high of 0.89 for Coca-Cola. The values of /i and p in Table 3 are
statistically greater than zero at the ninety-five percent confidence level.
Table 4 reports the results of the ARMA(1,1) process. Table 4 shows that the
average of /i is 0.846 and that of p is 0.862, which are significantly greater than zero.
8These results do not support the VAP. The convergence rates, p, are much higher when
we apply the ARMA(1,1) process rather than the AR(1) process. Also, the n values of
ARMA(1,1) process are significantly greater than zero for all the stocks. The
convergence rates of ARMA(1,1) process are consistent with those of Litzenberger and
Sosin (1977). A high convergence rate means that the premiums or discounts of primes
and scores are persistent over time. The chi-square statistics for the ARMA(1,1) model
are smaller than those for the AR(1) model in all of the companies. Thus, the
ARMA(1,1) model appears to be better than the AR(1) model in explaining the behavior
of premiums or discounts in scores and primes. In sum, the results from the AR(1) and
ARMA(1,1) models are not consistent with the predictions of the VAP. These results
are consistent with Jarrow and O'Hara.
Tables 5 and 6 report the results on nonparametric tests of Dp runs test and sign
test, respectively. The average expected number of runs is 249 when the sample is
assumed to be random. But the actual number of runs is 157 on average, which is much
smaller than the hypothesized number of 249. The results reject the randomness of D
t
at
the five percent significance level in all samples, which indicates that D
t
observed above
the median would be followed by another D
t
above the median so that the behavior of
D
t
is systematic rather than random. The sign test is used to test the null hypothesis that
the population median of premiums is equal to zero. Table 6 shows that D
t
is
significantly greater than zero at the five percent significance level for all the companies.
Again, these results contradict the predictions of the value additivity principle.
I.
W
-
Reexamination of r>vnam,> H.^ng Cnst Savino Hyp^wj.
According to the dynamic hedging cost saving hypothesis, scores provide a means
of saving on the costs of dynamic hedging. Whi]e long-term options like scores do not
exist in the option market, it is posstble to replicate a long-term option through a process
of dynamic hedging, i.e., by rolling over short-term options in the options market.
However, this may require enormous transactions costs. Even though the long-term
characteristic of the score is not unique, the score may be valuable if i, economizes on
the transaction costs via dynamic hedging.
Jarrow and O'Hara (1989) use the Black-Scho.es model with daily revised Implied
Standard Deviations (1SD) relative to the model based on historical volatility measures as
a means for testing the dynamic hedging cos. saving hypothesis. They show that the
Black-Scholes model based on ISDs revised daily is superior to the model based on
historic variances for predicting score prices. Since the ISD may reflect the cost of
dynamic hedging over the option's life whereas the historical volatilities do not, they
argue that the premium may be attributable to the score's ability to save transaction costs
of dynamic hedging.
However, this is indirect and weak evidence. The superior performance of the
Black-Scholes mode, with ISDs revised daily may no, be related to the dynamic hedging
cost saving. 7 Chesney and Scot. (1989) show that the Black-Scholes model with
changing ISDs outperforms the Black-Scholes mode, with historic variances for predicting
call option prices on the dollar/Swiss Franc exchange rates, which are short-term
European options and thus do not have dynamic hedging cost savings. One possible
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interpretation of the superior performance of the Black Scholes model with ISDs revised
daily is that the market makers and the traders are using the variations of the Black-
Scholes formula with daily revisions in the variance implied in the score. Therefore, the
comparison between the Black-Scholes model with historic variances and the one with
ISDs revised daily may not be directly related to the dynamic hedging cost saving
hypothesis, but instead merely indicate the superior performance of the Black-Scholes
model with ISDs revised daily compared to the one with historic variances. We
reexamine the dynamic hedging cost savings hypothesis using an alternative and direct
method.
The dynamic hedging cost saving hypothesis predicts that dynamic hedging cost
savings will decrease over time since the number of times a short-term option must be
rolled over in order to create a long-term option such as score decreases when the
maturity date is approached. Therefore, the premiums in scores and primes, which are
equivalent to the dynamic hedging cost savings, will decrease over time. The dynamic
hedging cost saving hypothesis, thus, implies the negative relationship between time and
premiums in prime and scores.
One way to test the relationship is to calculate the Pearson correlation coefficient
between time and premiums in scores and primes. We use two different data sets. One
data set includes the whole period from July 1, 1987 to June 30, 1989. The other data
set excludes the data from July 1, 1987 to December 31, 1987 in order to avoid a possible
impact of the market crash of October 19, 1987, covering the period January 1, 1988 to
June 30, 1989.
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The results are presented in Table 7. Eleven out of twenty-six companies are
significantly negative in the correlation coefficient when we use the data for the whole
sample period (Panel A). However, only four out of twenty-six companies show
significantly negative correlation coefficients for the period from January 1, 1988 to June
30, 1989 (Panel B). This casts serious doubts on the validity of the dynamic hedging cost
savings hypothesis.
To investigate further the dynamic hedging cost saving hypothesis, four groups are
constructed for different time periods. Group A includes the data set from July 1, 1987
to December 31, 1987. Group B consists of the data from January 1, 1988 to June 30,
1988. Group C consists of the data from July 1, 1988 to December 31, 1988. Group D
consists of the data from January 1, 1989 to June 30, 1989. For the fixed lives of primes
and scores, the null hypothesis on the premiums will be
Hy mean of Group A > mean of Group B
H2 : mean of Group A > mean of Group C
H3 : mean of Group A > mean of Group D
H4 : mean of Group B > mean of Group C
H5 : mean of Group B > mean of Group D
H6 : mean of Group C > mean of Group D
For each hypothesis, the decision rule is
12
Reject H if /v x / J ,.. w— <Z
where Xj,Xj = the mean of Group i and j, respectively,
n^nj = the sample size for Group i and j, respectively,
Z = the Z value at the five percent significance level.
Table 8 reports the results. Nine and eleven out of twenty-six companies are
rejected under the hypotheses H
:
and H2, respectively, in panels A and B of Table 8. In
other words, the average premiums in scores and primes from July 1, 1987 to December
31, 1987 are significantly less than or equal to those from January 1, 1988 to June 30,
1988 and those from July 1, 1988 to December 31, 1988 for nine and eleven out of
twenty-six companies, respectively. These results are not strongly inconsistent with the
prediction of the dynamic hedging cost saving hypothesis. Note, however, that Group A
covers the period including the market crash. The test results of H3 and H4 are stronger.
Fifteen and sixteen out of twenty-six companies are rejected under H3 and H4
respectively, in panels C and D of Table 8. The average premiums in scores and primes
from July 1, 1987 to December 31, 1987 are not significantly greater than those from
January 1, 1989 to June 30, 1989 for fifteen out of twenty-six companies. Also, the
average premiums in scores and primes from January 1, 1988 to June 30, 1988 are not
significantly greater than those from July 1, 1988 to December 31, 1988 for sixteen out of
twenty-six companies. For the hypotheses, H5 and H6 , twenty-three and twenty-two out
of twenty-six companies are rejected, respectively, in panels E and F of Table 8. The
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average premiums in scores and primes from January 1, 1988 to June 30, 1988 are not
significantly greater than those from January 1, 1989 to June 30, 1989 for twenty-three
out of twenty-six companies and the average premiums in scores and primes from July 1,
1988 to December 31, 1988 are not significantly greater than those from January 1, 1989
to June 30, 1989 for twenty-two out of twenty-six companies. Thus, the results are not
consistent with H5 and H6 .
In sum, the results strongly suggest that the premiums tend to increase as the
maturity approaches, which is contradictory to the transaction cost saving hypothesis.
V. Concluding Remarks
We test the VAP using primes and scores based on parametric and nonparametric
methods. The results based on both methods suggest that the deviations of combined
score and prime prices from stock prices are significantly greater than zero and thus the
VAP does not hold. We show that the transaction cost saving hypothesis for the
deviations suggested by Jarrow and O'Hara (1989) is not well supported by empirical
results using a large data set and more direct methodology. This result leaves the
puzzling question: where does the premium come from? In light of the recent trend of
unbundling a security and trading the components separately, this question seems to be
very relevant and needs to be addressed.8
One possible answer may lie in the structure itself of primes and scores, i.e., the
premium may be simply due to the fact that any investor can recombine the prime and
score to get the stock at no fee prior to the termination date but not vice versa. Another
14
possible reason, which is not mutually exclusive with the above, may be the expanded
trading opportunities in an incomplete market. One of the critical assumptions
underlying the VAP is the market completeness in Arrow-Debreu sense. Arbitrage
assures in a complete market that the sum of the market values of the securities must
equal the present value of the income streams no matter how the securities are issued to
the contingent income streams. If the sum of the prime and score is lower than the stock
price, the investor can get the arbitage profit by buying a prime and a score, exchanging
them for a stock at the trust, and selling it back in the market. On the other hand, if the
stock sells at discount, one needs to be able to buy the stock, tender it to the trust for a
prime and a score, and sell them back in the market for an arbitrage. Since this is not
permitted after the trust is closed, one needs to buy the stock and sell short a prime and
a score and hold them until the maturity, unless the prime and score can be created
using other securities so that the market is complete.9 Thus, as Sosin (1978) shows, the
premiums may be simply due to the neutral recapitalization, i.e., dividing the stock into a
prime and score, which expands investors' trading opportunities in an incomplete market.
Sosin(1978) argues that "if the recapitalization by firm expands the trading opportunities
of investors, then the unambiguous prediction is that a neutral recapitalization by a firm
would increase its value relative to the values of all other firms in its risk class."(p. 1230)
A similar argument can be found in Mossin (1969) and Ingersoll (1987). However, direct
empirical tests on exactly what conditions in an incomplete market must be present for
the VAP to hold or break down are yet to be done.
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Footnotes
l.Jarrow and O'Hara (1989) also investigate the possibility that
the price differentials of scores and primes may lead to arbitrage
opportunities. They show that transaction costs, small daily
trading volumes in primes and scores, short-sale constraints and
limits on the size of trust may restrict the ability of investors
to arbitrage away these premiums.
2. In a related paper, Barber (1989) develops a simple tax model to
demonstrate the size of the premium when the marginal investor in
the prime is taxed at a lower rate than the marginal investor in
the underlying common stock. He argues that primes and scores can
sell at a premium to the underlying common stock when the marginal
investor in the prime pays a tax rate on dividends which is less
than the tax rate faced by the marginal investor in the common
stock. The marginal investor in the prime can be an incorporated
investor which receives a 70 percent corporate dividend tax
exclusion. That is, the prime may be more valuable than the score
because the prime gives the marginal investor the opportunity to
receive the 70 percent corporate dividend tax exclusion. Barber
shows, using primes and scores for November 1987-December 1988,
that the cumulative abnormal excess returns and volumes in the
prime increase through 10 days after the ex-dividend date; that
behavior may be consistent with the dividend clientele hypothesis
stating that tax-motivated buying and selling occurs surrounding
the ex-dividend date. Barber's empirical results, however, do not
strongly support his arguments because the excess returns and
trading volumes in primes around ex-dividend dates are much less
than those in scores and underlying stocks. Thus, the tax-based
hypothesis is ignored in this paper.
3. The term "prime" stands for "prescribed right to income and to
maximum equity," while "score" for "special claim on residual
equity.
"
4 . In a related study, Burns (1987) tests the VAP for financial
assets, Standard Oil securities for 120 trading days from June 10
through Novenber 1, 1912. He finds that the daily prices of
equivalent Standard Oil portfolios accurately describe their
average market values and the portfolio values display covergent
adjustment behavior that tends to equalize them quite rapidly. He
also shows that the average difference between the market value of
a portfolio of subsidiaries and the market value of Standard Oil
old stock as a single unit, is not significantly different from
zero. He therefore concludes that the result is consistent with the
VAP in equilibrium.
5 . AT&T-Series 1 was not used because AT&T was divested after the
Series 1 was formed. It is not clear the impact the divestiture had
on the prime and score values.
16
6.Modigliani and Miller (1958) state that the M-M theorem describes
only the central tendency around which observations will scatter
because there are lags and frictions in the equilibrium process.
Litzenberger and Sosin (1977) test the M-M theorem by examining the
central tendency of the observed departures between income and
capital shares and net asset values.
7,Jarrow and O'Hara (1989) calculate the daily ISD from the score
price. When they use the weighted ISD from the CBOE options in
order to predict score prices, the Black-Scholes model with the ISD
of the CBOE options is inferior to the Black-Scholes model with the
ISD of score prices.
8. For example, the techniques of unbundling a security and trading
the components separately can be found in the Unbundled Stock Units
(USUs) and the SuperShares. USUs were proposed by Shearson-Lehman
in December 1988. Each USU, with 30 years maturity, consists of a
base yield bond, an incremental dividend preferred share, and an
equity appreciation certificate. A base yield bond pays quarterly
coupons equal to the current dividend payout and a predetermined
face value at maturity. An incremental dividend preferred share
pays dividends in excess of the current level and a predetermined
face value at maturity. An equity appreciation certificate can be
exchanged for one share at maturity for an exercise price.
However, this USUs proposal was withdrawn by Shearson-Lehman for
some reasons on March 18, 1989. SuperShares were proposed by
SuperShare Services Corporation, a major owned subsidiary of Leland
O'Brien Rubinstein Associates Incorporated. SuperShare trust
consists of four types of SuperShares: Appreciation Supershares
(Upside Appreciation SuperShares) which provide leveraged
participation in market gains, Priority SuperShares (Index Income
SuperShares) which provide income in a slightly rising market,
Protection SuperShares (Downside Protection SuperShares) which
protect a market portfolio against a decline of up to 30 percent in
value, and High Yield SuperShares (Money Market Income Shares)
which provide additional income during flat or rising markets.
9. It is well known that in a complete market the marginal rates of
substitution should be the same for every investor and thus the VAP
holds. However, in an incomplete market, it does not necessarily
follow that the marginal rates of substitution of the different
contingent claims are equated for every investor. Hirshleifer
(1970) shows that the complete market requires that the marginal
rates of substitution for all investors are equal to the market
prices in each state. But in an incomplete market, the consumptive
optimum condition is that a weighted sum of the marginal rates of
substitution is equal to the price of security and thus the
marginal rates of substitution may differ for each individual.
17
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Table 1
Description of the Trusts'
Company Term, date Term, claim Beginning trading
Amer. Exp. 08/24/92 50 07/13/87
Am. Home Pdt. 12/20/91 90 01/27/87
ATT-Series2 02/14/92 30 03/11/87
Amoco 03/30/92 105 05/01/87
Arco 07/01/92 116 07/28/87
Bristol Myers 02/14/92 110 03/11/87
Chevron 07/01/92 75 06/15/87
Coca-Cola 08/06/92 56 07/28/87
Dow 05/13/92 110 05/14/87
DuPont 03/27/92 110 02/19/87
Kodak 04/15/92 92 06/22/87
Exxon 09/20/90 60 12/05/35
Ford 06/30/92 104 06/22/87
GE 05/11/92 140 04/27/87
GM 06/30/92 107 07/28/87
GTE 07/15/92 44 07/06/37
HP 07/27/92 90 08/13/87
IBM 06/30/92 210 07/20/87
J&J 06/30/92 118 10/21/87
Merck 04/14/92 200 04/10/37
Mobil 06/30/92 60 07/01/87
Philip Morris 07/27/92 110 10/27/87
P & G 06/01/92 105 07/15/87
Sears 07/15/92 64 07/06/87
Union Pacific 04/15/92 87 05/28/37
Xerox 07/15/92 97 10/26/87
aSource: Barron's (March 14, 1988).
Term, date is the termination date of the trust
Term, claim is the termination claim.
Table 2
Summary of Premiums in Primes and Scores'
Company N Mean Median S.D. Min Max
Amoco 505 0.57 0.63 1.09 -3.06 4.25
Am. Home Pdt. 505 0.58 0.50 1.15 -3.87 6.25
ATT-Series2 505 0.77 0.75 0.56 -1.13 2.75
Arco 489 0.60 0.63 1.04 -11.90 4.25
Amer. Express 500 0.50 0.50 0.49 -0.63 1.99
Bristol Myers 505 0.67 0.63 1.24 -3.00 6.75
Chevron 505 1.22 1.12 1.24 -3.88 10.37
Coca-Cola 489 0.94 0.50 1.53 -1.13 10.87
Dow 505 1.22 1.12 1.24 -3.88 10.38
DuPont 505 0.43 0.38 1.05 -4.88 5.45
Kodak 505 0.92 0.64 1.45 -2.13 15.12
Exxon 495 0.21 0.01 0.89 -4.00 7.00
Ford 505 0.59 0.63 1.07 -2.25 4.50
GE 505 0.93 0.88 1.40 -3.00 9.25
GM 489 0.60 0.50 0.94 -1.50 4.87
GTE 505 0.41 0.38 0.50 -0.75 2.13
HP 488 0.44 0.38 0.79 -2.00 4.50
IBM 495 1.11 1.00 1.11 -1.75 8.62
J & J 474 0.78 0.63 1.19 -6.25 5.25
Merck 505 1.28 0.63 2.46 -4.00 11.51
Mobil 505 0.31 0.26 0.63 -1.13 4.62
Philip Morris 489 1.97 1.50 2.47 -7.63 10.38
P & G 498 0.67 0.75 1.03 -5.00 11.88
Sears 505 0.36 0.37 0.51 -2.13 2.25
Union Pacific 505 0.75 0.75 0.70 -2.25 7.25
Xerox 488 0.78 0.63 1.25 -5.13 17.00
Premium = Score price + Prime price - Stock price.
N is the number of observations.
Mean is the average of premium over the sample period.
Median is the median of premium over the sample period,
Min. is the minimum premium.
Max. is the maximum premium.
S.D. is the standard deviation of the premium.
Table 3
a
AR(1) Process Estimation of Premiums
D
t
= M + pDt-1 + Bt
where D is the premium in primes and scores
Company u P R
2
0.499
2
X
Amer. Home Prdt. 0.56 0.71 28.70*
(0.12) (0.03)
Amoco 0.57
(0.08)
0.43
(0.03)
0.236 33.75*
Arco 0.59
(0.06)
0.30
(0.04)
0.088 9.42
AT&T-Series 2 0.81
(0.07)
0.82
(0.02)
0.664 33.51*
Amer. Express 0.50
(0.03)
0.48
(0.03)
0.234 43.21*
Bristol Myers 0.67
(0.10)
0.54
(0.03)
0.289 27.66*
Chevron 0.65
(0.04)
0.26
(0.04)
0.071 27.29*
Coca-Cola 0.95
(0.26)
0.89
(0.02)
0.796 58.55*
Dow 1.222
(0.08)
0.41
(0.04)
0.168 35.48*
DuPont 0.A2
(0.07)
0.46
(0.04)
0.207 30.46*
Exxon 0.21
(0.05)
0.20
(0.04)
0.041 3.10
Ford 0.59
(0.08)
0.50
(0.03)
0.250 37.99*
GE 0.94
(0.11)
0.48
(0.04)
0.225 18.90*
GM 0.59
(0.10)
0.71
(0.03)
0.469 47.88*
GTE 0.75
(0.11)
0.68
(0.09)
0.319 44.05*
HP 0.44
(0.05)
0.32
(0.04)
0.103 51.70*
IBM 1.11
(0.09)
0.59
(0.03)
0.350 49.61*
J & J 0.79
(0.09)
0.46
(0.04)
0.210 53.96*
Kodak 0.92
(0.14)
0.68
(0.03)
0.451 45.27*
Merck 1.28
(0.28)
0.75
(0.02)
0.563 47.92*
Sears
Union
Table 3 (continued)
Company
—y p
0.31
( °;°
7
5 > <0.03)
P 5 G
( °-^ } <°-°2)
0.67 0.15
(0-05) (0.04)
0.35 0.54
(0.04) (0.03)
0-75 0.20
Xerox (
°'° 3) <°'°4)
0-56 0.47
(0.04) (0.03)
3
The numbers in parentheses represent standard errors and 2S"3SratftlM WhiCh <"< "» ^Po-esis^^ £ Li^aXs
^represents that the statistics are significant at the five percent
Table 4
aARMA(1,1) Process Estimation of Premiums'
D
t
= U + pD t_ 1
+ e
t
+ 6e
t_ 1
Company U P 6
2
X
AHP 0.49 0.89 0.41 4.53
Amoco 0.58 0.84 0.49 5.11
Arco 0.59 0.35 0.06 9.08*
Am. Express 0.56 0.95 0.74 13.47*
AT&T-
2
0.99 0.94 0.39 9.75*
Bristol Myers 0.66 0.87 0.52 6.66
Chevron 0.66 0.84 0.65 2.80
Coca-Cola 0.95 0.97 0.45 10.38*
Dow 1.21 0.86 0.61 18.42*
DuPont 0.40 0.84 0.55 20.10*
Exxon 0.21 0.36 0.16 3.01
Ford 0.75 0.98 0.82 19.55*
GE 0.95 0.82 0.47 5.19
GM 0.61 0.95 0.57 4.95
GTE 0.84 0.86 0.61 6.37
HP 1.50 0.99 0.88 7.27
IBM 1.23 0.98 0.78 8.65*
J & J 1.19 0.99 0.82 3.81
Kodak 0.90 0.93 0.53 8.17*
Merck 1.04 0.97 0.62 14.57*
Mobil 0.32 0.87 0.48 8.05*
Philip Morris 2.23 0.99 0.56 11.11*
P & G 0.68 0.95 0.89 3.82
Sears 0.41 0.89 0.43 17.24*
Union 0.76 0.70 0.52 3.83
Xerox 0.63 0.91 0.68 4.53
aThe statistics related to y, p, and 9 are not shown in the table,
but all estimates are significant at the five percent level.
* represents that the statistics are significant at the five percent
level.
Table 5
Statistics for Runs Test
H : D is random
z =
R-n/2-1
/(n2-2n)/4(n-l)
Number of runs Expected Z
Company above & down number3 statistics
Amer. Home Prdt. 138 253 -10.3*
Amoco 174 253 -7.04*
Arco 195 245 -4.50*
Amer. Express 175 249 -6.66*
AT&T-
2
101 254 -13.6*
Bristol Myers 144 253 -9.70*
Chevron 190 252 -5.58*
Coca-Cola 105 245 -12.7*
Dow 196 253 -5.08*
DuPont 186 252 -5.91*
Exxon 212 248 -3.24*
Ford 163 253 -3.02*
GE 158 253 -8.45*
GM 110 245 -12.2*
GTE 103 251 -13.3*
HP 199 241 -3.28*
IBM 134 248 -10.2*
J & J 161 235 -6.89*
Kodak 118 253 -12.0*
Merck 173 253 -7.12*
Mobil 142 253 -9.89*
Philip Morris 143 243 -9.10*
P & G 180 249 -6.22*
Sears 150 253 -9.18*
Union 205 250 -4.02*
Xerox 127 243 -10.6*
Expected number represents the hypothesized number of runs when the
data are assumed to be random.
* indicates that the statistics are significant at the five percent
level.
Table 6
Statistics for Sign Test
Company Number above Number below Z-statistic
Amer. Home Prdt. 353 135 9.82*
Amoco 352 139 9.57*
Arco 384 83 13.88*
Amer. Express 398 67 15.30*
AT&T-
2
471 29 19.72*
Bristol Myers 351 139 9.53*
Chevron 417 69 15.74*
Coca-Cola 336 116 10.30*
Dow 435 60 16.81*
DuPont 346 135 9.58*
Exxon 252 201 2.35*
Ford 342 139 9.21*
GE 369 120 11.21*
GM 336 127 9.67*
GTE 367 93 12.73*
HP 337 120 10.10*
IBM 438 46 17.77*
J & J 359 98 12.16*
Kodak 370 122 11.14*
Merck 343 146 8.86*
Mobil 325 143 8.37*
Philip Moriris 434 46 17.66*
P & G 396 89 13.89*
Sears 364 107 11.79*
Union 436 48 17.59*
Xerox 376 92 13.08*
Number of values above hypothesized median.
Number of values below hypothesized median.
* indicates that the statistics are significant at the five percent
level.
Table 7
Pearson Correlation Coefficients Between Time and Premiums
or Discounts in Primes and Scores
Panel A: Total period (July 1, 1987 to June 30, 1989)
Correlation
Company coefficients Prob.
Amer. Home Prdt. 0.281 0.0001*
Amoco 0.126 0.0046*
Arco -0.071 0.1162
Amer. Express -0.141 0.0016*
AT&T-Series 2 -0.142 0.0014*
Bristol Myers 0.413 0.0001*
Chevron -0.204 0.0001*
Coca-Cola -0.574 0.0001*
Dow 0.217 0.0001*
DuPont 0.095 0.0334*
Exxon 0.135 0.0027*
Ford 0.252 0.0001*
GE 0.133 0.0028*
GM -0.107 0.0177*
GTE 0.163 0.0272*
HP -0.096 0.0336*
IBM -0.334 0.0001*
J & J 0.309 0.0001*
Kodak 0.085 0.0576
Merck -0.452 0.0001*
Mobil -0.107 0.0164*
Philip Morris 0.632 0.0001*
P & G 0.069 0.1255
Sears -0.594 0.0001*
Union -0.079 0.0760
Xerox -0.122 0.0070*
Significance probability of the correlation.
* represents that the statistics are significant at the five percent
level.
Table 7 (continued)
Panel B: Subperiod (January 1, 1988 to June 30, 1989)
Company
Amer. Home Prdt
Amoco
Arco
Amer. Express
AT&T-Series 2
Bristol Myers
Chevron
Coca-Cola
Dow
DuPont
Exxon
Ford
GE
GM
GTE
HP
IBM
J & J
Kodak
Merck
Mobil
Philip Morris
P & G
Sears
Union
Xerox
Correlation
coefficients Prob. a
-0.084 0.1037
0.180 0.0004*
-0.012 0.8111
0.177 0.0005*
0.226 0.0001*
0.398 0.0001*
-0.018 0.7301
-0.141 0.0058*
0.418 0.0001*
0.028 0.5853
0.109 0.0343*
0.588 0.0001*
0.300 0.0001*
0.177 0.0005*
0.317 0.0001*
-0.183 0.0003*
0.023 0.6494
0.569 0.0001*
0.465 0.0001*
-0.352 0.0001*
0.338 0.0001*
0.719 0.0001*
0.162 0.0016*
-0.388 0.0001*
-0.046 0.3765
0.269 0.0001*
Significance probability of the correlation.
* represents that the statistics are significant at the five percent
level.
Table 8
Comparison of Mean Premiums Among Groups
Panel A: mean of A group > mean of B group
Company
Amer. Home Prdt
Amoco
Arco
Amer. Express
AT&T-Series 2
Bristol Myers
Chevon
Coca-Cola
Dow
DuPont
Exxon
Ford
GE
GM
GTE
HP
IBM
J & J
Kodak
Merck
Mobil
Philip Morris
P & G
Sears
Union
Xerox
A - B<
-1. 17
0. 10
0. 35
0.,32
0.,29
-0.,34
0.,54
2.,27
0,,37
-0,
.25
-0,.07
0,.95
.42
.56
-0
.21
.61
1 .06
.45
.86
2 .05
.70
-0
.29
.04
.42
.05
.98
t-vailue
-8. 59*
0.,67*
1..98
5.,91
3.,51
-2,,11*
7,,03
11,,65
1,,99
-1,.56*
-0,.57*
8 .59
2 .37
4 .58
-1 .14*
5 .15
7 .03
2 .46
4 .60
5 .86
9 .30
-1 .19*
.23*
8 .15
.44*
4 .98
Mean of Group A minus mean of Group B.
Group A includes scores and primes from July 1, 1987 to December 31,
1987.
Group B includes scores and primes from January 1, 1988 to June 30,
1988.
* indicates that the null hypothesis is rejected at the significance
level of five percent.
Table 8 (continued)
Comparison of Mean Premiums Among Groups
Panel B: H
2 : mean of A group > mean of G group
1.13
t-value
2-98 16>51
-°' 01
-0.06*
Company
_
a
Amer. Home Prdt. •, 00
Amoco J; ,;
-8.59*
Arco 3qo5
-1.01*
Amer. Express '- Q
-0.26*
AT&T-Series 2
'XI
U * 68
Bristol Myers
* 4 ' 70
Chevon -?*°° -^.90*
Coca-Cola n 'H 2.34
Dow
DuPont
Exxon
Q
'°.l 0.11*
Ford ""•" -1.07*
GE
°'f; 3.20
GM * 7 2.58
GTE
HP
-0.13
-1.04*
IBM ?*? 5 3.13
J & J
Kodak U, t°. 1.14*
Merck l ' 3
.} 7.16
Mobil ;?'£* 9.47
Philip Morris no? 7 ' 33
P & G
"JJ ,^
-3.94*
Sears °"*° 1.04*
Union "*;; H.37
Xerox : .1 2.66
l 'U 16.02
l ' 6A 11.83
5.71
a
Mean of Group A minus mean of Group C.
Group A includes scores and primes from July 1, 1987 t0 December ^
Group C includes scores and primes from July 1, 198 8 to December 31,
^S'S^^?011 hyP°theSiS ^ reJ6Cted 3t the ^^ificance
Table 8 (continued)
Comparison of Mean Premiums Among Groups
Panel C H. mean of A group > mean of D group
Company
Amer. Home Prdt
Amoco
Arco
Amer. Express
AT&T-Series 2
Bristol Myers
Chevon
Coca-Cola
Dow
DuPont
Exxon
Ford
GE
GM
GTE
HP
IBM
J & J
Kodak
Merck
Mobil
Philip Morris
P & G
Sears
Union
Xerox
A - D
-1. 02
-0. 46
0. 32
0.,17
0..10
-1.
.28
0.,56
2..48
-0,.59
-0,.45
-0,
.31
-0,.52
-0,
.55
.23
-0
.08
.22
1 .03
-0
.85
-0
.48
3 .06
.32
-3
.92
-0
.31
.78
.09
.50
t-vailue
-3. 19*
-3.,05*
1. 92
2.,81
1.,21*
-8.,46*
6.,57
13,,44
-3,.33*
-3,.16*
-2,.37*
-4
.59*
-2 .79*
2 .42
-0 .49*
2 .84
6 .97
-4
.23*
-2 .30*
9 .37
4 .14
-11 .56*
-1 .99*
14 .77
.83*
2 .43
Mean of Group A minus mean of Group D.
Group A includes scores and primes from July 1 , 1987 to December 31
,
1987.
Group D includes scores and primes from January 1, 1989 to June 30,
1989.
* indicates that the null hypothesis is rejected at the significance
level of five percent.
Table 8 (continued)
Comparison of Mean Premiums Among Groups
Panel D: H , : mean of B group > mean of C group
Company
Amer. Home Prdt
Amoco
Arco
Amer. Express
AT&T-Series 2
Bristol Myers
Chevon
Coca-Cola
Dow
DuPont
Exxon
Ford
GE
GM
GTE
HP
I3M
J & J
Kodak
Merck
Mobil
Philip Morris
P & G
Sears
Union
Xerox
B - C
-0.05
-0.12
-0.40
0.27
0.09
-0.A6
-0.21
0.71
-0.38
0.27
-0.06
-0.58
0.05
0.68
0.29
-0.26
0.A8
-0.35
0.45
1.09
-0.15
-0.64
0.12
0.25
0.22
0.15
t-value
-0.36*
-1.85*
-3.67*
5.29
2.46
-3.37*
-1.88*
7.98
-3.30*
2.31
-0.63*
-5.00*
0.35*
6.09
1.07*
-2.98*
6.17
-2.80*
5.35
5.80
-2.24*
-6.39*
1.21*
4.90
2.79
1.24*
Mean of Group B minus mean of Group C.
Group B includes scores and primes from January 1, 1988 to June 30,
1988.
Group C includes scores and primes from July 1, 1988 to December 31,
1988.
* indicates that the null hypothesis is rejected at the significance
level of five percent.
Table 8 (continued)
Comparison of Mean Premiums Among Groups
Panel E: He: mean of B group > mean of D group
Company
Amer. Home Prdt
Amoco
Arco
Amer. Express
AT&T-Series 2
Bristol Myers
Chevon
Coca-Cola
Dow
DuPont
Exxon
Ford
GE
GM
GTE
HP
IBM
J & J
Kodak
Merck
Mobil
Philip Morris
P & G
Sears
Union
Xerox
B - D°
0.15
-0.56
-0.03
-0.15
-0.19
-0.94
-0.02
0.21
-0.96
-0.20
-0.14
-1.47
-0.97
-0.33
-0.41
-0.29
-0.03
-1.30
-1.34
1.01
-0.38
-3.63
-0.35
0.36
0.04
-0.48
t-value
1.34*
-3.77*
-0.34*
-2.44*
-3.71*
-7.60*
-0.22*
2.17
-7.66*
-1.67*
-2.31*
-12.84*
-6.17*
-2.71*
-2.63*
-3.32*
-0.29*
-10.79*
-9.90*
5.65
-5.65*
-13.77*
-3.35*
8.43
0.45*
-4.43*
Mean of Group B minus mean of Group D.
Group B includes scores and primes from January 1, 1988 to June 30,
1988.
Group D includes scores and primes from January 1, 1989 to June 30,
1989.
* indicates that the null hypothesis is rejected at the significance
level of five percent.
Table 8 (continued)
Comparison of Mean Premiums Among Groups
Panel F: H, : mean of C group > mean of D group
Company C - D t-value
Amer. Home Prdt. 0.20 1.36
Amoco -0.34 -2.50*
Arco 0.37 4.10
Amer. Express -0.42 -7.27*
AT&T-Series 2 -0.28 -5.77*
Bristol Myers -0.48 -3.72*
Chevon 0.23 1.94
Coca-Cola -0.50 -7.78*
Dow -0.58 -5.28*
DuPont -0.47 -5.28*
Exxon -0.13 -1.80*
Ford -0.89 -7.48*
GE -1.02 -6.26*
GM -1.01 -12.71*
GTE -.88 -3.16*
HP -0.03 -0.40*
IBM -0.61 -6.84*
J & J -1.05 -9.03*
Kodak -1.79 -13.76*
Merck -0.08 -0.52*
Mobil -0.23 -3.46*
Philip Morris -2.99 -11.62*
P & G -0.47 -5.24*
Sears 0.11 2.36
Union -0.13 -2.71*
Xerox -0.63 -5.70*
Mean of Group C minus mean of Group D.
Group C includes scores and primes from July 1, 1988 to December 31,
1988.
Group D includes scores and primes from January 1, 1989 to June 30,
1989.
* indicates that the null hypothesis is rejected at the significance
level of five percent.


